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The Impact of Bounds v. Smith on
City and County Jail Facilities
INTRODUCTION
In Bounds v. Smith' the United States Supreme Court
held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the
courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the prep-
aration and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing pris-
oners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law."'2 The Court established a tenuous
balance between the constitutional rights of indigent prisoners
and the affirmative duty placed upon the states to protect the
exercise of those rights. The breadth of the Bounds decision,
however, raised legitimate doubts as to its constitutional scope.
Recently, in Williams v. Leeke,3 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals held, that local jails incarcerating misdemeanants
for terms of up to twelve months have an affirmative duty to
provide inmates with access to adequate law libraries or ade-
quate legal assistance.' Williams proposes answers to two im-
portant questions regarding the reach of Bounds' constitutional
mandate: (1) whether the affirmative duty set forth in Bounds
applies to local jails as well as state correctional facilities; and,
if so, (2) what criteria should be used for ascertaining whether
jails comply with the Bounds requirement.
The purpose of this comment is to test the propriety of
constitutionally requiring local jails to provide inmates with
adequate law libraries or comparable legal assistance, begin-
ning with a brief exposition of Williams. Subsequent to an
examination of the constitutional bases of the right of access
to the courts, the natural parameters of the Bounds decision
will be considered. Finally, the unique position of local jails in
1 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
2 Id. at 828. Bounds was the first full Supreme Court opinion which expressly
imposed affirmative obligations upon the states to insure that indigent prisoners have
meaningful access to the courts. Six years earlier, in Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15
(1971), the Court affirmed per curiam a district court decision requiring California to
provide indigent inmates with access to adequate law libraries.
584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1340.
BOUNDS V. SMITH
the corrections system will be discussed, concluding with a
search for satisfactory criteria to fashion a workable constitu-
tional standard for the protection of jail inmates' right of access
to the courts.
I. Williams v. Leeke
In Williams v. Leeke, 5 four prisoners appealed to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals from adverse judgments dis-
missing their complaints in various district courts. Each of the
prisoners claimed to have been denied his respective constitu-
tional right of access to the courts as provided in Bounds v.
Smith.' With Chief Judge Haynsworth 7 writing for the major-
ity, the court affirmed the dismissal of three of the prisoners'
complaints.' However, the court reversed the dismissal of ap-
pellant George Brown's complaint and remanded the case to
district court for further findings of fact.'
Appellant Brown was an inmate serving a sentence for a
misdemeanor in the Richmond, Virginia, City Jail. The jail
provided its inmates with a law librar. Brown, while admit-
ting that the library was adequate for his needs, claimed that
jail regulations restricting his access to that library rendered
such access meaningless. Those regulations restricted access to
the library to three days a week for only forty-five minutes per
Id. at 1336.
430 U.S. 817 (1977). See text accompanying note 1 supra for an exposition of the
Bounds holding.
7 Chief Judge Haynsworth joined the majority in Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541
(4th Cir. 1975), affl'd, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
584 F.2d at 1339. Two of the complainants were prisoners from the Virginia State
prison system. The court dismissed their complaints because Virginia provided a pro-
gram of legal assistance and posted notice of that program at each state prison facility.
Id.
The other appellant was imprisoned in the South Carolina State prison system.
The court found that the state was justified in prohibiting direct access to its prison
'library where the prisoner presented a maximum security risk and where South Caro-
lina had provided a limited legal assistance program. Id.
I Id. at 1340. Three issues were to be resolved on remand: (1) whether a Virginia
statute supplying legal counsel to prisoners applied to inmates at the Richmond jail;
(2) whether the jail had taken the necessary steps to notify jail inmates of such a
program if it applied to them; and (3) whether appellant Brown's claim was simple




visit. Furthermore, no research assistance was provided to pris-
oners.
The court held that Brown's complaint stated a constitu-
tional violation on its face, stating that "meaningful legal re-
search on most legal problems cannot be done in forty-five
minute intervals."'0 Chief Judge Haynsworth concluded that
such harsh restrictions on library access could be justified only
by providing research assistance." Most importantly, the court
expressly relied upon Bounds as the basis for its holding.'2 The
court noted that "a prisoner in a city jail is entitled to reasona-
ble access to the courts and that is not provided one serving a
substantial sentence of confinement if, without other legal as-
sistance, he has access only to a law library which is so re-
stricted as to be unmeaningful."' 3 Thus, the court not only
determined that Bounds' imposition of an affirmative duty
applies to local jails, it considered the length of the jail in-
mates' sentences as a criterion to measure the adequacy of the
jail's library under Bounds' constitutional standard. While the
court recognized that the provision of a law library might be
unreasonably expensive, it noted that Bounds could be satis-
fied by providing adequate legal assistance, which might be
somewhat less expensive."
10 Id.
" "[Olne cannot expect prisoners to immediately turn to exactly the right case,
or to immediately discover the proper legal avenue to explore in search of an answer
to their problems." Id.
11 Id. at 1339, 1340 n.2. The soundness of applying Bounds to local jails is dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 47-73 infra.
" 584 F.2d at 1340-41 (emphasis added).
" The per-institution cost of adequate law libraries might vary from $6,000 to
$30,000 depending on the needs of the institution's inmates. Ancillary expenses include
upkeep and library assistance costs. See ABA JOINT CoraMrTTEE ON THE LEGAL STATUS
OF PRISONERS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION PROJECT ON STANDARDS RELATING TO THE LEGAL
STATUS OF PRISONERS (Tent. Draft 1977) reprinted in 14 Am. CraM. L. REv. 377, 438-43
(1977).
The cost of providing legal assisance in lieu of a library would depend on the size
of the institution and its function within the penal system. It has been suggested that
"[tihe ratio of attorneys to prisoners should be one attorney for 400 prisoners. If each
attorney has the assistance of one full time paralegal and two law students, the ratio
can be reduced to one attorney for 800 prisoners." ABA RESOURCE CENTER ON CORREC-
TIONAL LAw AND LEGAL SERVICES, PROVIDING LEGAL SERVICES TO PRISONERS, reprinted in
8 GA. L. REV. 363, 431 (1974). Assuming that the base salary for the services of a full-
time attorney is $16,000, the cost of providing a part-time attorney for the needs of
100 inmates at the suggested ratio would be approximately $4,000 each year.
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Circuit Judge Hall wrote a vigorous dissent regarding the
disposition of appellant Brown's claim. He argued in the alter-
native that (1) the Bounds decision imposed an institutional
duty "only upon state correctional facilities for prisoners serv-
ing long terms of incarceration,' 5 but, assuming that Bounds
applies to local jails, (2) the library access provided by the
Richmond City Jail satisfied Bounds' constitutional require-
ments.' 6
At the heart of a correct analysis of the Williams decision
is a recognition of the constitutional bases of Bounds. Once
these foundations can be discovered, traditional concepts of
constitutional law may then be utilized to provide a proper
resolution of the issues in Williams.
II. Bounds v. Smith: THE SOURCE AND STRENGTH
OF ITS CONsTrrunoNAL MANDATE
A. The Fundamental Right of Access to the Courts
The fundamental constitutional right of access to the
courts has defied precise location in the United States Consti-
tution.'7 While one provision in the first amendment has been
identified as its source,"8 the Supreme Court has relied upon
the Due Process' and Equal Protection" Clauses of the four-
"' 584 F.2d at 1341. Restricting Bounds to require only an institutional duty is tied
to the effect incarceration has in discriminating against indigent prisoners. See text
following note 48 infra for a more detailed explanation.
"Id.
'7 "The constitutional right of access to the courts is a concept which is nebulous
at best. Even the constitutional origins of the right are unclear." Doe v. Schneider,
443 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Kan. 1978).
Contributing to the complexity of the problem are cases referring to the right of
access to the courts in a non-criminal context. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (right of access to the courts applies in state controlled divorce proceeding); and
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (right of access to the courts applies where
persons are attempting to redress violations of their civil rights).
11 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Reeves, The Evolving Law of Prison
Law Libraries, 3 NEw ENGLAND J. PRISON L. 131, 133 (1976). U.S. CONsT. amend. I
reads in part: "Congress shall make no law .. .abridging .. .the right . .. to
petition Government for a redress of grievances."
11 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
and Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) all specifically refer to the Due Process Clause.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.2 provides in part: "No State shall.., deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
20 Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), affirmed a district court decision 'relying
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teenth amendment as its basis in cases involving the derivative
right 2 of access to adequate law libraries or adequate legal
assistance. The question of whether the right of access to the
courts is derived from the first or fourteenth amendments is
relatively unimportant. Even if a right is not specifically in-
cluded in the Bill of Rights it may be considered fundamental
if its exercise is necessary to protect or preserve other constitu-
tional rights.2 Thus, the "fundamentalness" of the right of
access to the courts is a conclusion drawn from the fact that a
constitutional claim cannot be enforced without access to a
forum for redress of that claim.23
Therefore, where Bounds v. Smith24 requires that prisoners
should be provided with "meaningful access to the courts," '
the statement cannot be read in the generic sense. It must be
read to require such access only if the prisoner alleges a viola-
tion of a fundamental constitutional right." For example, pris-
upon the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 provides in part:
"No State shall. . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
21 A "derivative" right is one that springs out of a broader right. For example,
there would be no constitutional right of access to law libraries or legal assistance if
the right of access to the courts was fulfilled in some other way. See Recent Decisions,
Prisoners' Right to Access to Legal Material, 8 GONZAGA L. REv. 340, 344 n.8. (1973).
2 For example, the right of travel may protect other rights such as the right to
work. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2 Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and
the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REV. 223, 254
(1970).
To label a particular right as fundamental categorically is to avoid analysis,
unless a general conclusion concerning the importance of the right has al-
ready been drawn from an examination of the nature of the right as exercised
or a general conclusion made that the right is of such a nature as not to be
readily regulable.
Id.
21 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
25 Id. at 823.
21 See id. at 825: "The inquiry is rather whether law libraries or other forms of legal
assistance are needed to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts."
Initially, the right of access to the courts was thought to be fundamental only
where the right to present claims of habeas corpus was involved. See Ex Parte Hull,
312 U.S. 546 (1941). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), however, the Court
found the right of access to the courts to be a fundamental one where the prisoner had
asserted a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Potuto, The Right of
Prisoner Access: Does Bounds Have Bounds?, 53 IND. L.J. 207, 209, (1978). Professor
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oners with valid habeas corpus claims2 or complaints regarding
living conditions2s are guaranteed a meaningful disposition of
their claims. Because of its unique importance to prison in-
mates, the right of access to the courts has been called the





B. The Role of Constitutional Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion in Preserving the Indigent Prisoner's Right of Access to the
Courts
Despite uncertainty in deciding where the right of access
originates, its application is made constitutionally imperative
to the states through the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Though earlier "right of
access" cases explicitly relied upon one protection exclusive of
the other,'3 the Supreme Court apparently utilized both of
them in Bounds.
3 1
The Bounds Court relied upon the Equal Protection
Clause to require states to supply "additional measures to as-
sure meaningful access to inmates unable to present their own
cases. ' 32 Applying the equal protection analyses of Burns v.
Potuto concludes that Wolff could be construed to include any prisoner asserting any
legal claim.
"' Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 321 U.S. 546 (1941).
n Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
2' Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1383 (D. Del. 1974).
11 Some courts based their decisions primarily upon the Due Process Clause. This
result is particularly true where state action consisted of active or effective interference
with a prisoner's access to the courts. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); John-
son v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Kirby v. Black-
ledge, 530 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1976); Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 917; Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961); Mathis v.
DiGiacento, 430 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Stevenson v. Reed, 391 F. Supp. 1375
(N.D. Miss. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944.
Other decisions use an equal protection rationale. Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567
(1st Cir. 1973); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom.
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
31 The word "apparently" is used because the Bounds Court failed specifically to
mention the fourteenth amendment, due process, or equal protection anywhere in the
opinion. This failure leaves some doubts regarding the standard of review. For a discus-
sion of that subject, see notes 42-46 infra and accompanying text.
1 430 U.S. at 824.
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Ohio, 33 Smith v. Bennett,3' Griffin v. Illinois,3 and Douglas v.
California36 by analogy, the Court held that where a state cre-
ates classifications which discriminate upon the basis of eco-
nomic status and the discrimination infringes upon a prisoner's
fundamental rights, that state has an affirmative duty to cor-
rect the constitutional violation.3 1 In Bounds, the Court implic-
itly found that North Carolina's state prison system discrimi-
nated against indigents as a matter law." This finding must
have been based on the assumption that an indigent cannot
have meaningful access to the courts if he is incarcerated and
does not have appointed counsel.
Though Bounds' dependence upon the Equal Protection
Clause provides the justification for an affirmative duty, the
Due Process Clause measures the parameters of that duty. The
Court unmistakably spoke in terms of due process when it
stated that access to the courts must be "meaningful""5 and
that a state must provide "adequate" law libraries or
-360 U.S. 252 (1959). The Burns Court held that a state which makes available
an appeal process but requires indigents to pay filing fees violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 257.
3, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). The Court found a violation of equal protection where a
state required indigents to pay filing fees for writs of habeas corpus. Id. at 714.
" 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The issue in Griffin was whether a state that had provided
avenues of appeal must furnish indigent appellants with a trial transcript required for
appeal. The Court stated: "Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence." Id. at 17-18. See also Comment,
Prisoners' Right of Access to Legal Materials, 26 U. FIA. L. REv. 161, 162-64 (1973).
38 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The Douglas Court held that states must provide counsel
for criminal indigents in their first appeal as of right. Id. at 358.
For a discussion of how Burns, Bennett, Griffin, and Douglas relate to the right
of access to the courts, see Note, Prisoner's Rights-Failure to Provide Adequate Law
Libraries Denies Inmates Right of Access to the Court, 26 KAN. L. REv. 636, 638-40
(1978). See also Note, The Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil
Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 554, 560-61 (1976).
" 430 U.S. at 824-25. The "affirmative duty" concept is lifted from the line of
equal protection cases considered in notes 33-36 supra. Invidious discrimination
against indigents as a class arising from the fact of their incarceration is examined in
notes 47-73 infra and accompanying text.
The Bounds dissent found no equal protection violation and thus no concomitant
duty to provide law libraries or legal assistance. 430 U.S. at 839.
u430 U.S. at 828. Such an implication arises when the Court's legal analysis and
its holding are compared.
11 430 U.S. at 823. Such language suggests that a prisoner's right to be heard must
not be a mere sham. This suggestion is precisely what due process contemplates:
"minimum or adequate protection." Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 256.
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"adequate" legal assistance." What, then, is "adequate"? The
Bounds Court held that each plan "must be evaluated as a
whole to ascertain its compliance with constitutional stan-
dards."4 Bounds contemplates a case-by-case determination of
adequacy and thus awaits the development of practical guide-
lines of review.
It is not completely clear what standard of review was
applied by the Bounds Court because both the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses played a role in the decision. If the
right being protected is considered to be "fundamental," both
clauses traditionally require the state to justify its action by
demonstrating a "compelling" interest.2 The Court balanced
North Carolina's interests against the prisoners' interest in
being heard. In this balance, while economic factors may be
considered by a state in choosing the least expensive method
of providing access to the courts, "the cost of protecting a con-
stitutional right cannot justify its total denial."43 Therefore, to
satisfy Bounds'standard of scrutiny, a state must provide some
justification other than. a financial one."
" 430 U.S. at 828.
' Id. at 832.
The due process element in Bounds derives from the constitutional rule recognized
in Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (prisoner's right of access violated when prison
officials refused to notarize or mail his petition for writ of habeas corpus); Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (a regulation prohibiting assistance from "jailhouse law-
yers" denied some inmates access to the courts); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974) (allowing prisoners bringing statutory civil rights action to invoke the funda-
mental right of access to the courts). This rule provides that a state may not actively
or effectively impair a prisoner's access to the courts where that prisoner's claim is a
constitutional one. See Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 251.
42 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (where the fundamental right to
travel is involved, the Equal Protection Clause requires a "compelling" state interest
to override the fundamental right); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (where the
fundamental right of access to the courts is involved, the Due Process Clause requires
a "compelling" state interest). See Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the
Court for Indigents, 82 YLxE L.J. 1055, 1069 (1973).
,1 430 U.S. at 825.
" The Court's language in Bounds is so unequivocal that it seems that an eco-
nomic interest may never be sufficient. However, that thought must be considered in
light of the federal funding assistance available to implement the proposed program
in Bounds. Id. at 829-30. But see Note, Prison Law Libraries: Meaningful Access to
the Courts, 7 CAPrrAL U.L. REv. 469, 481-82 (1978): "[T]he dissenting decisons of
Justices Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist may be an indicator that the high-water mark
has been reached in expanding the duty of the states to bear both the cost of and
responsibility for providing adequate research facilities or legal programs." Id.
10711978-79]
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Bounds v. Smith thus proposes a bifurcated standard of
review. The first level of scrutiny is based upon the Equal
Protection Clause and, presumably, requires the state to dem-
onstrate a "compellirig" interest if it has failed to take affirma-
tive action to prot6ct indigent prisoners' rights of access to the
courts. 5 The second level is based upon the Due Process Clause
and, presumably, balances the effect of an inmate's incarcera-
tion against the state's interests to determine whether the
prison's plan of assistance is adequate."
IMl. THE PROPRIETY OF APPLYING Bounds v. Smith
TO LOCAL JAI FACILITIES
A. A Possible Limitation: Construing Bounds to Require an
"Institutional" Duty
The rule of Bounds v. Smith47 provides that the state has
discriminated against indigent prisoners as a matter of law
where its prisons fail to provide law libraries or legal assistance
from persons trained in the law." It can reasonably be inferred
from Bounds that the discrimination prohibited arises from the
very fact of an indigent's incarceration in prison. If such an
inference is credible, then perhaps a distinction may be drawn
between state prisons and local jail facilities by weighing and
comparing the barriers which each place in the way of indigent
inmates' access to the courts. Thus, if local jail facilities are not
inherently discriminatory the Equal Protection Clause would
not apply, leaving only the protection of the Due Process
Clause.
The Bounds opinion did not mention whether or not local
jails must comply with its holding. One of the defendants in the
case was a state correctional system, but the Court did not
" This strict standard of scrutiny is not inconsistent with Bounds. There, the
Court rejected the state's interest in economic integrity in the face of the fundamental
interest of the prisoners. 430 U.S. at 825.
"' "The due process clause, which protects life, liberty, and property, is often
described as governing a flexible concept whose parameters depend on the context in
which it is asserted." Potuto, supra note 26, at 219. The flexibility of due process
regarding the application of Bounds to local jails will be discussed in notes 74-82 and
accompanying text infra.
430 U.S. 817.
This conclusion is based upon the factors appearing in note 38 supra.
1072 [Vol. 67
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expressly limit its holding to the facts. There could be some
significance attached to the reference to "prison authorities,"
in the holding of the case, but that alone cannot provide
enough evidence to prove the proposition that local jails were
excluded from the decision's mandate. The citation of Cruz v.
Hauck," though, could be persuasive to indicate that local jails
were within the scope of Bounds. In Cruz, the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded a decision holding that legal materials
need not be furnished to county jail inmates in light of Younger
v. Gilmore. 10 However, this case is not controlling because the
Court recognized in Bounds that "Gilmore is not a necessary
element in the . . . analysis."'"
The above considerations, however, are mere tangents to
a sound analysis. The crucial inquiry should focus upon the
Court's finding of discrimination which triggered the applica-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. That is, does discrimina-
tion arise from the fact of an indigent's incarceration? The
Bounds Court concluded that it did. That conclusion could
have been based upon one or more of the following factors: (1)
the state prison system retains exclusive control of prisoners'
activities and therefore prevents indigents from improving
their economic status; 5 (2) the fact of a prisoner's incarceration
renders him unable effectively to preserve his financial well-
being;53 and (3) the geographic remoteness of the state prison
facilities makes contact with legal assistance and the outside
world difficult. 4
' 404 U.S. 59 (1971).
50 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
11 430 U.S. at 828-29. Also, in the Cruz case upon remand, Bexar County Jail was
held to have assumed some of the functions of a state prison facility and thus owed a
duty to provide access to adequate law libraries or adequate legal assistance. Cruz v.
Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917.
52 This factor focuses upon the indigent prisoner's inability to improve his finan-
cial situation on his own initiative. Few prisons pay significant wages for work and
what little the prisoner earns must go toward articles of daily necessity. See Potuto,
supra note 26, at 220. Cf. Wetmore v. Fields, 458 F. Supp. 1131 (W.D. Wis. 1978)
(prisons radically assault and impair individual freedom).
13 Whatever financial investments a prisoner has on the outside may suffer from
the fact of his incarceration. Even those who are not indigent at the beginning of their
sentence may be so years later.
11 "This distance makes access to the courts more burdensome. One burden placed
on access, for example, is that attorneys and law school clinics may be less able because
1978-79] 1073
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The question then becomes whether indigent prisoners in
local jails are prevented from having meaningful access to the
courts by the fact of their incarceration. In Williams v. Leeke, s5
Judge Hall noted in his dissent the functional differences be-
tween state prisons and local jails and found that Bounds im-
posed merely an institutional duty upon "state correctional
facilities for prisoners serving long terms of incarceration." 6
The important question was whether the local jail had
"assumed some functions served by the state penal system. 57
The following criteria were proposed to resolve that question:
(1) the average length of incarceration; (2) the makeup of the
prison population; (3) the function of the facility; (4) the size
of the jail population; and (5) the degree of prisoner access to
legal assistance in the jail.58
If the average length of imprisonment is relatively brief,
the absence of adequate law libraries or adequate legal assist-
ance does not prevent meaningful access to the courts because
the jail sentence would be served before it could be chal-
lenged. 5 Similarly, the function of an institution and the
of the distance between their base of operations and the prison." Potuto, supra note
26, at 221 n. 98.
584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978).
"' Id. at 1341.
5' Id. at 1343. This analysis is a useful method for requiring some local jails to
comply with Bounds and yet allowing others to be beyond its reach. Accordingly, jails
that are really not "jails" do not escape the application of Bounds even if it is limited
to require merely an "institutional" duty. The approach was proposed by the court in
Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 332 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917.
A similar distinction was approved by the Supreme Court in McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263 (1973):
As the statute and regulations contemplate state evaluation of an inmate's
progress towards rehabilitation, in awarding good time, it is reasonable not
to award such time for pre-trial detention in a county jail where no system-
atic rehabilitative programs exist and where the prisoner's conduct and per-
formance are not even observed ... by the ... state prison officials.
Id. at 271-72.
51 584 F.2d at 1343-45.
31 In local jails imprisoning inmates for six months or less, the provision of law
libraries or legal assistance to raise constitutional grievances would be frustrated by
the brevity of confinement.
County jails are generally short-term holding facilities confining individ-
uals serving misdemeanor sentences, or awaiting trial or transfer to prisons
.... Therefore, in determining whether all inmates have adequate access
to the courts, the district court need not consider those inmates whose con-
BOUNDS V. SMITH
makeup of its population may be dispositive of an equal protec-
tion claim. For example, indigent pre-trial detainees have a
sixth amendment right to counsel. 0 Convicted felons awaiting
transfer to state or federal facilities would only be temporarily
deprived of access to the courts.6 ' Also, convicted misdemean-
ants serving short sentences would be released from custody
before a proper constitutional challenge to the conditions of
their confinement could be made.6 2 Finally, the number of in-
mates incarcerated and the degree of access to legal assistance
should be considered." Where the jail population is small and
attorneys are easily accessible, the fact of incarceration in such
a jail does not discriminate against indigent inmates.
6 4
This mode of analysis poses several drawbacks. The first
of these is that of nine post-Bounds federal court decisions, all
have assumed that Bounds applies equally to local jail facili-
ties. 5 Only three of those cases discuss the above criteria in
reaching their decisions, concluding that such distinctions be-
tween prisons and jails bear only upon the adequacy of the
libraries or legal assistance programs. 6 Until the Supreme
finement is of a very temporary nature.
Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 333 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917.
" Gideon v. Wainwright,,372 U.S. 335 (1963).
" 584 F.2d at 1343. Judge Hall concluded that temporary denial of access to law
libraries or legal assistance would not trigger the onus of the fourteenth amendment.
Id.
2 See note 59 supra for more discussion. Generally, the difficulty is that no matter
where the line is drawn, it will be somewhat arbitrary. Whether that line should be
drawn from two years to six months depends on the length of time reasonably required
to litigate a constitutional claim before the courts.
£ 584 F.2d at 1344. Similar factors were examined in a district court case decided
before Bounds, Tate v. Kassulke, 409 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Ky. 1976). The Tate court
held that even though the jail contained a fairly large population, because attorneys
were readily accessible a library was not constitutionally required. Id. at 658.
" 584 F.2d at 1344. The dissent contends that "attorneys are ever present in local
jails representing inmates in criminal prosecutions and thus are generally available."
Id.
, Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978); Wilson v. Wittke, No. 78-C-
706 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 1978); Woodson v. Ward, 78 Cir. 1404 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
6, 1978); Fluhr v. Roberts, No. C 77-0332-L (B) (W.D. Ky. Oct. 20, 1978); Owens-El
v. Robinson, 457 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp.
104 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Whiteagle v. Storie, 456 F. Supp. 302 (D. Neb. 1978); Bransted
v. Wolke, 455 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Stewart v. Gates, 450 F. Supp. 583 (C.D.
Cal. 1978); Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Pa. 1978); O'Bryan v.
County of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
U Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978) (jail owed duty to misdemean-
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Court chooses to create such a distinction, it is likely that these
cases will be followed.
Secondly, the Williams dissent considers the "collective
need"67 of jail inmates. It is arguable that even if only one
inmate qualified for the protection of Bounds, his fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts is a personal one",
and "the cost of protecting [that] . . . right cannot justify its
total denial."69 However, if very few indigent inmates would be
benefited by requiring local jails to comply with Bounds, the
significant economic burden 0 might rise to the status of a
"compelling" state interest.
The final factor militating against drawing such a distinc-
tion is that local jails house many pre-trial detainees and that
these prisoners have a constitutional right to defend pro se. It
has been argued that because Faretta v. California7' grants that
right, the pro se defendant has a concomitant Due Process right
of access to legal materials.72 However, the courts have refused
to recognize that argument, holding that Bounds is satisfied
where the defendant has been appointed counsel.
73
ants serving substantial sentences of up to twelve months to provide either adequate
law libraries, adequate legal assistance, or both); Fluhr v. Roberts, No. C 77-0332-L
(B) (W.D. Ky. Oct. 20, 1978) (county jail with average inmate population of from 400
to 650, with an average duration of confinement of one week, held required to establish
law library for inmates); O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (county jail with population of 170 inmates, 75% of whom were pretrial detainees,
held required to establish an extremely limited library).
" 584 F.2d at 1344.
u Constitutional rights are personal, not collective.
" 430 U.S. at 825.
"The cost of providing similar libraries to the decentralized county jails, where
the average number of inmates is far smaller and where most inmates have chosen to
be defended by counsel, would be extremely burdensome." Note, The Jail Pro Se
Defendant and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 86 YALE L.J. 292, 306 (1976).
71 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
n Since it is clear that the pro se right acclaimed by the Faretta Court
cannot be met if access to legal materials is cut off by virtue of the defend-
ant's incarceration pretrial or during trial, as a due process right access to
legal materials must be provided to the pro se incarcerated defendant. It is
error to conclude, therefore, that representation by an attorney, certainly
adequate. . . under Bounds can satisfy a state's obligation to provide legal
materials to an incarcerated pro se defendant since to so conclude would
obviate the pro se right.
Potuto, supra note 26, at 231-32.
13 United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. West,
557 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1977); Wilson v. Zarhadnick, 534 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1976).
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B. Judging the Adequacy of Local Jail Libraries or Legal As-
sistance Programs
Assuming that the failure to provide jail inmates with ei-
ther law libraries or legal assistance constitutes a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, the adequacy of any jail program
must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with
constitutional standards. 74 What is "meaningful access" to the
courts, then, may vary with the context in which the right is
asserted. Therefore, indigent jail inmates might require less
assistance in some circumstances than in others.
Williams v. Leeke75 reasoned that while the provision of a
law library for each small jail might be unreasonably expen-
sive,7" the use of advanced law student aid programs, parale-
gals, or attorneys could prove to be less expensive but nonethe-
less adequate.77 Similar considerations have caused courts to
7 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 832 (1977). No universally recognized set of
standards has been adopted by the Court. See Recent Cases, Prison Law Libraries Are
An Acceptable Means of Providing Prisoners With Their Constitutional Right of Ac-
cess to the Courts, 54 N. DAK. L. REv. 97, 102 (1977).
7' 584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978).
1' Id. at 1340.
77See note 14 supra for a comparison between the cost-efficiencies of the two
alternatives.
Even though the Bounds Court found that "pro se petitioners are capable of using
lawbooks to file cases raising claims that are serious and legitimate," 430 U.S. at 826,
there is some doubt as to the validity of that assertion.
For example, the Court stated in Johnson v. Avery that "[lails and penitentia-
ries include among their inmates a high percentage of persons who are totally or
functionally illiterate." 393 U.S. at 487. For these persons a law library is useless.
Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CAL. L. REv. 343, 352-53. See Werner,
The Present Legal Status and Conditions of Prison Law Libraries, 66 LAw Lm. J. 259
(1973):
It must not be forgotten that what prisoners really need is legal services
rather than law libraries in which they are left to do their own legal work.
Such inmate activity may well be educational and therapeutic, but provid-
ing them law libraries instead of lawyers is somewhat like sending a sick
person to a medical library instead of sending him to a doctor.
Id. at 268. See also Comment, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. REv.
514, 523.
Bounds might be seen as an apology for Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1976), which
held that a state had no duty to provide counsel for indigents on a discretionary appeal.
Along this vein, some have suggested that indigents should have appointed counsel for
collateral attack proceedings. See ABA JoiNT COMMITEE ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF
PmSONERS, supra note 14, at 375; Recent Case, State Must Devise System Ensuring
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require less complete law libraries78 and approve of programs
failing to provide direct physical access to law libraries.7" This
approach could allow local jails to keep the doors to the courts
open while reducing the economic burden of providing what
Bounds requires.
Bounds' Due Process component makes considerations
regarding the length of incarceration, the jail population, the
kinds of inmates involved, and the degree of inmate access to
legal assistance relevant as to the extent of affirmative aid
required, 80 instead of considering them to decide the issue of
state-enforced discrimination. This approach frees city and
county jails to decide which alternative imposes the least fiscal
burden .8 More extensive aid could be provided if state or fed-
eral funds were made available for local use.8"
CONCLUSION
County and city jails are significantly different from their
state and federal counterparts. It appears that some of those
differences could justify a distinction that would avoid the ap-
plication of the Equal Protection Clause. For example, the av-
erage length of incarceration in most local facilities seldom
exceeds two months, while inmates of state and federal prisons
serve sentences that are rarely shorter than one year. This con-
sideration separates the two categories of inmates as a practical
matter, the difference resting upon the time required by the
judicial system to process a challenge to confinement.
The makeup of the inmate population of the facility
should be determined. If the local jail houses only pre-trial
detainees, Bounds' requirements need not be satisfied because
Indigent Prisoner's Meaningful Access to the Courts, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 987, 993
(1972).
Is Fluhr v. Roberts, No. C 77-0332-L (B) (W.D. Ky. Oct. 20, 1978); and O'Bryan
v. County of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
71 Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104 (C.D. Cal. 1978); and Stewart v. Gates,
450 F. Supp. 583 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
8 This approach allows the courts to consider these criteria to determine "how
much aid" rather than using them to determine the threshold of a local jail's duty.
9 This freedom is particularly important because the strain on a county budget
could be awesome in some circumstances.
1* Perhaps the LEAA could provide funds much as it has in the case of state
correctional facilities. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 830 n. 19 (1977).
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the inmates would retain their sixth amendment right to coun-
sel. However, if the institution incarcerates those serving sub-
stantial misdemeanor sentences or is a state or federal prison
holding convicted felons, the inmates would be unprotected by
the sixth amendment.
The size of state and federal institutions similarly affects
the ability of indigents to have access to the courts. Larger
institutions are plagued by consistently lower attorney/prisoner
ratios, thus markedly decreasing the availability of sound legal
advice. The unavailability of professional legal advice is closely
related to the traditional geographic remoteness of state and
federal institutions. If the detention facility is a local one, at-
torneys are more likely to be available on a regular basis.
Each of the above factors must be weighed in light of the
policy behind Bounds-the protection of the indigent inmate's
right of access to the courts. The decisions should reflect a
genuine consideration of the unique characteristics of each fa-
cility. While all state and federal institutions must comply
with Bounds, courts should not require all local jail facilities
to provide libraries or comparable legal assistance for their
inmates. Local jails which are caused to comply with Bounds
would become the exception and not the rule.
If, however, a local jail is found to discriminate against its
indigent inmates, the Due Process Clause mandates that such
prisoners shall have access to reasonably adequate libraries or
comparable legal assistance. By considering the factors recog-
nized in the equal protection analysis as guidelines for the
quality and quantity of assistance required by due process, the
inmates' constitutional right of access to the courts shall be
safeguarded as well as the fiscal integrity of local governments.
Programs providing access to the courts would not be judged
by an inflexible standard.
While the majority in Williams v. Leeke properly applied
the above due process element of Bounds, only the length of the
inmate's sentence was considered in deciding the equal protec-
tion issue. A "litmus-paper" test for determining discrimina-
tion against indigent inmates is efficient but undesirable. The
important interests of both prisoners and the public demand
greater protection. In the future, courts should apply the bifur-
cated standard of Bounds to determine whether a duty exists,
and if so, the proper extent of that duty.
Philip W. Collier
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